University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive

OSSA 8

Jun 3rd, 9:00 AM - Jun 6th, 5:00 PM

Commentary on Shirali
Manfred Kraus

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Kraus, Manfred, "Commentary on Shirali" (2009). OSSA Conference Archive. 150.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA8/papersandcommentaries/150

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Commentary on Nima Shirali’s “Plato, Aristotle, and Generative
Logos in Democratic Deliberation”
MANFRED KRAUS
Philologisches Seminar
University of Tübingen
Wilhelmstraße 36
72074 Tübingen
Germany
manfred.kraus@uni-tuebingen.de

1. INTRODUCTION
Nima Shirali’s paper makes an interesting and innovative attempt at establishing common
ground between Plato’s and Aristotle’s views on rhetoric, and especially on deliberative
rhetoric. The basic idea is the implementation of a concept of “generative logos” in the
theories of those two thinkers. This concept very clearly originates from Noam
Chomsky’s concept of a ‘generative grammar’ (p. 7). Although it is as a rule not
illegitimate to employ modern concepts in interpreting ancient thinkers, nonetheless some
methodological reflections may be in order. In this respect some questions impose
themselves, but I will confine myself to just a few points.
2. “GENERATIVE LOGOS” GENERATED
Shirali’s pivotal term of “generative logos” creates a number of problems. Shirali uses the
term ‘generative’ in a terminological sense. Yet it is hard to find any concise, clear-cut
definition of that term in his explanations. In section 6 he resorts to the sixteenth-century
Spanish physician Juan Huarte, who was one of Chomsky’s main inspiring sources, for
an explanation that associates the term with Latin ‘ingenero,’ which means “engender” or
“generate.” Yet in Huarte’s system, the generation of new thoughts is primarily
associated with his second level of human intelligence, namely “normal human
intelligence,” not with the third one, i.e. “true creativity.” Yet later on Shirali admits that
Chomsky’s ‘generative’ theory on language, which does not go “beyond the bounds of
linguistics and psychology,” is not the basis of his analysis, but just a “valuable
paradigm” (p. 9), and when he states that “generative logos” must be (1) adaptive to
context, and (2) creative (p. 9), which I take to be his defining criteria, he appears to
associate it with Huarte’s third level of “true creativity.”
Definitions of ‘generative’ I find elsewhere refer to models that have the capacity
to generate all individual surface items of a system from a limited set of abstract basic
rules, and which in a self-contained manner react independently to different stimuli. In
that sense, rhetoric would perhaps qualify as a kind of language system on a superior
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level (possibly Huarte’s third level) that could be described in an analogous way by
Chomsky’s generative model.
Logos, a Greek term that is notoriously equivocal and hard to define, would also
perhaps call for some more substantial explanation than just a single remark in a footnote
that it will be used “to denote both reason and speech” (p. 2, note 3). But, most crucially,
when Shirali states that “generative logos” is “a term used by the Stoics” (p. 2), which,
for him, in a way seems to legitimate its application also to Plato and Aristotle, one
would wish to see some reference as to sources and context and on the precise Greek
term that would underlie such a notion. Certainly, logos was a core term and concept in
Stoic philosophy. One association might be that, in Stoic physics, logos was taken to be
the active substance or principle of all reality, acting on matter as the passive substance.
In that context, logos might perhaps be called productive; it represents Universal Reason
and is also equated with Fate or primordial fire. But this is physics, and even there to my
knowledge there is no such expression as “generative logos.” Or are we to think of the
concept of “logos spermatikos” or “seminal logos,” which, however, means that parts of
universal cosmic logos can be found in each being that has a soul and a mind? In Stoic
grammar and philosophy of language, on the other hand, logos has a completely different
function as the common term for any meaningful articulate linguistic utterance, and it is
not referred to as a productive or “generative” principle. Hence, without any more precise
explanation, the concept of “generative logos” as an ancient notion remains a puzzle.
3. (RE)BUILDING BRIDGES: PLATO AND ARISTOTLE
Shirali’s main objective, for which he uses his concept of “generative logos,” is to “create
a bridge” (p. 1) between the rhetorical theories of Plato and Aristotle. It is evident that
those theories are related to one another, since to a large extent Aristotle’s theory is a
response to and a critique of Plato’s very critical attitude towards rhetoric. This historical
relationship, however, is not always fully clear in Shirali’s text, as when he states that
Plato “echoes” Aristotle’s notions (p. 4) or that Plato “takes a bold step by dissolving [a]
dichotomy” posited by Aristotle (p. 15).
But Shirali rightly emphasizes the pivotal point of difference, namely that for
Aristotle rhetoric has the epistemological status of an art (téchnē), which it is clearly
denied by Plato. For Plato, rhetoric is nothing more than a mere routine or drill (empeiría)
acquired by frequent practise; at least that is how he qualifies rhetoric as it was practiced
and promoted by the sophists (see Plato, Gorgias 462b3-463b6; Phaedrus 260e2-7;
270b4-9; Laws XI, 938a3-4).
Aristotle, on the other hand, views rhetoric as neither a mere routine nor as a
science (epistēmē) in the full sense of the word, i.e. theoretical knowledge based on firm
axioms that are themselves either self-evident or sufficiently proven (see Nicomachean
Ethics VI 6, 1140b31-1141a1; Posterior Analytics II 19, 100a5-9), but as an art. Yet an
art—as Aristotle himself defines the term in the Nicomachean Ethics (VI 4, 1140a10;
a20-21)—is “a productive habit combined with true reason.” An art is thus not concerned
with fixed and invariable entities (as is science), but with the contingencies of human life,
with things “that might as well be other than they are,” as Aristotle puts it (e.g.
Nicomachean Ethics V 7, 1134b31; VI 4, 1140a1; a22-23; Rhetoric I 2, 1357a35-36).
Rhetoric, for Aristotle, is thus in the first place a productive activity, and the counterpart
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to its corresponding “practical” habit, which is prudence (phrónēsis), one of the
intellectual virtues. This might be of relevance, since Shirali views phrónēsis at the basis
of both rhetoric and democratic governance (pp. 2-3). But production (poíēsis) and
practice (prā́xis) (see pp. 4-5) in Aristotle are fundamentally different categories that
should never be confounded, and rhetoric in Aristotle should better not be called a
“practical art” (pp. 2 and 4). As an art, rhetoric is nonetheless capable of using method
(see Rhetoric I 1, 1354a8; b23; 1355a4) and of producing generalizable knowledge about
the ways in which it functions. This is what marks it off from mere routine (see Rhetoric I
1, 1354a6-11). A productive (or “generative”?) element in rhetoric is thus easy to find in
Aristotle.
As for Plato, Shirali makes use of a distinction between “deceptive” and “nondeceptive logos” once posited for Gorgias by George B. Kerferd (1981, pp. 133-135).
Continually based on Harvey Yunis (1996) as his source, he also rightly discerns an
earlier Platonic view on rhetoric as exemplified in the Gorgias, according to which
rhetoric is mere flattery (p. 5), from a “revised view” that can be found in the Phaedrus
(p. 11) and that would be characterized by a “combination of non-deceptive logos and
technē” and consequently by a rejection of the dichotomy between rhetoric and
instruction, i.e. the imparting of serious knowledge (pp. 11-12). But when, in the
following, the concept of dialectic is used to establish a link between Plato and Aristotle,
caution will be advisable. For Plato’s and Aristotle’s conceptions of dialectic are quite
different: Whereas for Aristotle dialectic (to which rhetoric is the counterpart) is the art of
discourse in dialogue vs. monological speech, Plato’s understanding of dialectic is aimed
at the methodical ascent to the one ultimate truth founded in the idea of the good itself, by
way of the technique of “collection-and-division” cited by Yunis (1996, pp. 195-197).
That for Plato dialectic (in the latter sense) is the true rhetoric, is a fundamental view of
Yunis’s, which he has expounded in greater detail in later publications (e.g. 2005).
Moreover, Plato’s views on extempore speech and speech-writing must of course
be contemplated against the background of his fundamental philosophical critique of
writing that is expounded later in the Phaedrus (273c-278e). It may also be mentioned in
passing that the practice of logography was not primarily practiced “for political use,” as
Shirali seems to imply (p. 12/21), but was mostly confined to judicial speech (yet of
course before the dḗmos as judges) (see Yunis 1996, p. 175).
Shirali is certainly right, on the other hand, in emphasizing the role of emotions in
rhetoric and the avoidance of force and violence as one of its objectives as a common
trait in Plato and Aristotle (sections 7 and 8). And he is also right in stressing the
importance of the adaptability of rhetorical logos to a particular audience (p. 13) and to
particular situations (e.g. p. 10) in the ever-changing world of political debate. It may be
arguable, however, if we really need a complex theory of amorphous and unstructured
logos acting upon equally unstructured and shapeless (p. 36) political settings to describe
that fact, which is almost a commonplace among rhetoricians and has been expressed in
the description of rhetoric as a “stochastic art,” that goes back to the Stoic Chrysippus,
aptly explained by Yunis as follows:
[R]hetoric is a conjectural art, one that involves flexibility and approximation [...] the rules of
rhetoric are not invariable but must be bent according to the demands of the occasion.” (Yunis
1998).
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4. DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION: WHY NOT THE SOPHISTS?
It strikes me that Shirali, in his analysis of the role of rhetorical logos in democratic
deliberation, concentrates entirely on Plato and Aristotle, who were both not really welldisposed toward democratic governance, and does not take into account the early
sophists. Their all-important pivotal term in fact was logos. They were highly interested
in what we now call rhetoric (themselves they used to call it the ‘art of logos’) and also in
the way language works as a system, and they were deeply involved in and influenced by
the system of democratic governance that was practiced in Athens at their time.
Obviously greatly impressed by the way political and judicial decisions were reached by
way of open debate in Athenian political assemblies and popular courts, they interpreted
the ‘art of logos’ as a kind of combat or competition (agṓn), and viewed logos as a
flexible tool and weapon in this competition.
Since Protagoras, for instance, advanced the view that two antithetic logoi could
be formulated on each and every issue, and that the weaker logos could always be made
to be the stronger by arguing (see Schiappa), and since Gorgias, in his Praise of Helen,
ardently described the power of logos to mould and shape both the emotions and the
opinions of any audience (see Segal 1962), it would appear that a lot could be gained by
at least integrating the sophists into Shirali’s narrative. It should also be noted that Plato’s
views on rhetoric are only fully intelligible if viewed against the background of sophistic
rhetoric.
5. CONCLUSION
To sum up, Shirali’s paper presents an interesting thesis that is well worth thinking about.
On the whole, it is also fairly well-argued, and its overall result is not unconvincing, even
if at times it reconfirms things already known. If there are problems with details, as
pointed out above, these may partly be due to the fact that the author appears to have
worked not always from the primary texts but from a rather small selection of very
heterogeneous secondary sources, which he follows more than closely, but the selection
of which is little accounted for. In dealing with ancient authors, however, recourse to the
primary texts is definitely imperative, even if read in translation. That said, I wish to
emphasize that Shirali’s thoughts are as a whole inspiring and provocative, and I hope
they will be further pursued, thereby eliminating some of the problems. To that end, in
the first instance a clarification of the precise meaning of the concept of “generative
logos” will be paramount.
Link to paper
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